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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is one for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. All claims arise out

of Appellee performing service on Appellant's skid steer and placing an engine in the
skid steer without Appellant's agreement to have such done and to Appellant's pecuniary
loss.
1. Standard on appeal.
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review
is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d
1365, 1367 (1994). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be
drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808
P.2d 876, 878 (1991). All doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the
motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn
therefrom, and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Doe v.
Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593
P.2d 402 (1979) (emphasis added). Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c); McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820
P.2d 360, 364 (1991). The burden at all times is upon the moving party to prove the
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absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Company,
92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969).

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS M'D DISPOSITION
This case was brought by Edged in Stone ("Edged"), through co-owners and

spouses Preston and Danielle George, on November 30,2010 against Caterpillar, Inc. and
Perkins Engines, Inc. After conducting discovery and receiving a return on a subpoena
duces tecum issued to Appellee, Northwest Power Systems, LLC (herein "Northwest"),

Edged amended its complaint, filing its Second Amended Complaint on September 19,
2011. Edged thereafter voluntarily dismissed all counts against Caterpillar, Inc. and
Perkins Engines, Inc., having determined to its satisfaction that the source of Edged
damages was Northwest.
Northwest filed for summary judgment on July 6, 2012, seeking summary
judgment on Edged's breach of contract claims, a breach of warranty claim, a negligence
claim, a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim and a claim for
unjust enrichment. Edged stipulated to dismiss as to Northwest all claims except the
contract and unjust enrichment claims, as the majority of the other claims were primarily
(or exclusively) directed toward Caterpillar and Perkins.
On August 3, 2012, the District Court heard oral arguments from Edged and
Northwest in regards to Northwest's motion for summary judgment, and then on
September 21, 2012 the District Court issued its Judgment for Dismissal in favor of
Northwest.
The District Court ruled for summary judgment against Edged on its contract
claim after finding that an employee of Edged's, Scott Webb (herein "Webb") was
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clothed with apparent authority to authorize work and the purchase of an engme,
fundamentally preventing Edged from prevailing on a breach of contract claim. As to the
unjust enrichment claim, the District Court ruled that Edged did not confer a benefit on
Northwest and thus Northwest could not appreciate a benefit and no inequity was to be
seen.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October 2007, Edged purchased from Rocky Mountain Machinery in

Blackfoot, Idaho, a Compact Power 500 Series Boxer 526 DX Mini Skid Loader ("Skid")
with a Perkins diesel engine. (R at 41, 11 6). At about 600 hours of operation, in May
2009, the Skid lost power and began blowing smoke with accompanying knocking
sounds. (R at 41,11 22; R at 149, 150, 156, pp. 103, 104, 128,11.5-25, 1-3,4-7). Preston
George ("Preston"), the owner and president of Edged, had the Skid taken into Rocky
Mountain Machinery for diagnoses and repair. (R at 150, p. 104, II. 7-9).
Preston was directed to take the Skid to Northwest, an authorized Perkins' repair
center in Boise, Idaho, for warranty repair work. (R at 43, 11 26). Preston called ahead to
Northwest and directed Scott Webb ("Webb") to bring the Skid to Northwest for
diagnosis. (R at 151, 152, pp. 111, 112,11.23-25, 1-10). Northwest diagnosed the Skid's
problem as dirt entry into the air manifold and dusting of the engine's cylinders. (R at
297). This diagnosis came from Northwest despite Edged's performance of daily, staunch
maintenance on the engine. (R at 144-146, pp. 80-90; R at 200; R at 109, p. 31, 11. 9-19).
According to Preston, Northwest contacted him to let him know the engine was
bad and that it would need to be replaced. (R at 155, pp. 125, 126, 11. 2-25, 1). Without
receiving any authorization from Preston for the engine replacement, Northwest
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proceeded to replace the engine. (Dep. of Mark Adams at 26,30, 11. 12-14, 10-13, taken
5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013). Adams claims to have gotten authorization from
Webb for the replacement of the engine. (ld. at 24, 25, 11. 7-25, 1-5, taken 5/23/2012,
augmented 3/15/2013). Webb was not authorized to deal with Northwest. (R at 152, 172,
pp. 115, 194, ll. 17-22, 13-15). Adams admits that he received nothing in writing
granting him authorization to replace the engine. (Dep. of Mark Adams. at 25, 11. 6-9,
taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013). Adams also admits that he had no way of
knowing whether Webb had authority to deal with him directly in making a decision to
replace the engine. (ld. at 26,11. 1-11, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013). Adams
further states, contrary to Preston's testimony, that at no point in the process did he speak
with Preston directly. (ld. at 26, 11. 12-14, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013). Yet
Adams acknowledges that he knew \Vebb was not the "boss" and that Webb purported to
have gotten approval from Preston, his boss. (ld. at 26, 11. 1-11, taken 5123/2012,
augmented 3/15/2013).
Edged did not want Northwest to replace the engine. (R at 43, <]I 32; R at 157, pp.
132, 133, ll. 20-25, 1-15). If Northwest and Adams had informed Edged of the nonwarranty nature of the engine replacement, Edged would have had the engine rebuilt by
its in-house mechanic at a substantial savings. (ld.). Instead, Northwest replaced the
engine without authorization. (R at 173, p. 199, 11. 11-16). No written memorandum
exists to show an agreement or authorization to replace the engine. (Dep. of Mark Adams
at 25, ll. 6-9, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013).
When Northwest informed Edged of the replacement, that it was not covered
under warranty and that it had a $6,000 bill for the replacement, Edged was surprised, at
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the very least having believed that, had a replacement occurred, it would be covered
under warranty. (R at 158, pp. 136, 137,
the replacement. (R at 158, p. 137,

n.

n.

21-25, 1-14). Edged was unable to pay for

15-21). Edged, just wanting the Skid back to have

the engine rebuilt and to put the Skid to work, asked that the new engine be removed. (R
at 174, p. 202,11. 10-11). Accordingly, Northwest removed the engine, but insisted that it
be paid for its labor in replacing and then removing the engine. (Dep. of Mark Adams at
44, 45, 11. 18-25, 1, taken 512312012, augmented 3/15/2013). Edged was still unable to
pay this bill. (R at 43, <j{ 37). Edged looked to Perkins Engines, Inc. and Compact Power,
Inc. for some relief, but both manufacturers placed the blame on each other. (ld.).
With Edged unable to pay the underlying bill for labor on the replacement and
removal of the engine in its Skid, Northwest kept possession of the Skid, preventing
Edged from rebuilding the Skid's engine and using the Skid in its peak summer season of
landscaping contracts. (R at 43, <j{<j{ 39-41; Dep. of Mark Adams at 45,

n.

13-23, taken

5/23/2012, augmented 3/1512013).). As a direct result, Edged suffered tremendous

financial losses. (R at 44, <j{<j{ 39-41).

II.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the District Court erred in finding that the pleadings, depositions,

and admission on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that Appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Breach
of Contract.
1.

Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in finding that
an agency relationship existed between Scott Webb and Appellant,
where such determinations are for the trier of fact.
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11.

Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that
Appellant's employee, Webb, had apparent authority to enter into
the additional oral contract alleged by Appellee.

Ill.

Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in not finding
that the Statute of Frauds prevents Appellee from presenting
evidence of the additional oral contract alleged by Appellee.

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Appellant Edged in Stone, Inc. requests attorney fees on appeal on the bases of
Idaho Appellate Rule 41, IDAHO CODE §§ 12-120(3) & 121. The underlying action is on a
contract relating to the purchase or sale of services and/or a commercial transaction. The
further basis for Appellant's request for attorney fees on appeal is that, should Appellant
be the prevailing party on this appeal, IDAHO CODE §12-120(3) makes mandatory the
allowance of reasonable attorney fees.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

EXISTANCE OF AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP IS A QUESTION FOR
THE TRIER OF FACT
In response to the breach of contract claim brought by Edged, Northwest has

raised the defense that Edged, through its employee, Webb, contracted to have the Skid
engine replaced, suggesting that Northwest performed according to the contract. The
District Court correctly ruled that Webb had no actual (expresslimplied) authority. (R at
593). However, the District Court also ruled that apparent authority existed sufficient to

defeat Edged's contract claim on summary judgment. (R at 598), This ruling as a matter
of law on the issue of apparent authority on summary judgment was in error.
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Simply stated, the complaint in this case came with a demand for jury trial (R at
48). As such, in this case, the jury would be the ultimate trier of fact. This Court has held
that the "existence or lack of authority of an agent is a question of fact." Idaho Title Co.
v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 468 (1975), citing Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho
10 (1972). Specifically, this Court has held that "whether or not there is apparent
authority on the agent's part to act as he acted-it is a question for the trier of fact to
resolve from the evidence." Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 498 (1985), citing Clark v.
Gneiting, 95 Idaho at 12; John Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. Roselle, 77 Idaho 142, 146
(1955); Thornton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 108 (1953) (emphasis in the original). Where
there is any reasonable factual dispute as to whether an agent, such as Webb, has
apparent authority, a ruling as a matter of law is improper, as the trier of fact (the jury) is
to resolve this dispute.
As shown herein, there is a factual dispute as to whether Webb had apparent
authority beyond bringing the Skid to Northwest. In essence, however, Adams claims to
have gotten permission from Webb to replace the engine, relying on an apparent authority
argument. (Dep. of Mark A.dams at 25, 11. 2-5, taken 5123/2012, augmented 3/15/2013).
Meanwhile, Preston states very bluntly that Webb's authority extended only to his
bringing the Skid to Northwest for diagnosis and that he had no authority to authorize
repairs. (R at 152, 153, pp. 115, 116,11. 17-25, 1-7).
In presenting this factual dispute, Northwest has the burden of proving to a jury,
the trier of fact, that Webb had apparent authority to approve of the engine replacement
because the party alleging the existence of an agency relationship carries the burden of
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proof. Gissel v. State, 111 Idaho 725, 729 (1986), citing Transamerica Leasing Corp. v.
Van's Realty Co., 91 Idaho 510 (1967); Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415 (1952).
B.

APPARENT AUTHORITY IS NOT CREATED BY THE ACTS OR
STATEMENTS OF THE AGENT ALONE

Northwest, through its owner, Adams, stated that at no point in time pertinent to
the underlying process did he speak with Preston directly. (Dep. of Mark Adams at 26,

n.

12-14, taken 5123/2012, augmented 3/1512013). He also acknowledges that he was aware
that Webb was not the "boss" and that Webb purported to have gotten approval from
Preston, the boss. (ld. at 26,11. 1-11, taken 512312012, augmented 3/1512013).
This Court has held that "apparent authority of an agent cannot be created by the
acts or statements of the agent alone." Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96
Idaho 465, 468 (1975), citing Killinger v. lest, 91 Idaho 571 (1967); Clements v. Jungert,
90 Idaho 143 (1965). Taking Adams at his word, Adams knew Webb was simply an
agent yet never spoke with anyone but Webb. This although the "declarations of an
alleged agent made outside the presence of the alleged principal are, of themselves,
incompetent to prove agency." Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12 (1972), citing Cupples
v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466 (1922). Adams now asks the courts to hold that Webb had
apparent authority although such would necessarily be based solely on the "acts or
statements of the agent." This is contrary to case law precedent and the common law
precepts of agency.
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C.

NO APPARENT AUTHORITY EXISTED FOR THE AGENT TO
CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT
Edged argued below, and continues to argue, that, to establish apparent authority,

there must be more than the subjective belief of the third party. See Hilt v. Draper, 122
Idaho 612, 618 (et. App. 1992). "One must use reasonable diligence to ascertain the
agent's authority." Hausam v. Schanbl, 126 Idaho 569, 573 (et. App. 1994). "Reasonable
diligence encompasses a duty to inquire with the principal about the agent's authority."

Id. (emphasis added). "If no inquiry is made, the third party is chargeable with knowing

what kind of authority the agent actually had, if any, and the fault cannot be thrown
on the principal who never authorized the act or contract." Podol an v. Idaho Legal Aid
Services, Inc., 12:3 Idaho 937,944 (et. App. 1993) (emphasis added).
Northwest and Adams cmmot show that they acted with reasonable diligence in
relation to Webb and Edged. In fact, when asked if Webb "ever indicate[d] to [him] that
he had authority to deal with [Northwest] directly in making these decisions," Adams
stated as follows:
A. I had no way of knowing if that was true or not. He
brought the machine here. He represented Edged in Stone.
He said he had talked to his boss, and he said that he got
the approval to fix it.

Q. But at no point in this process did you speak with
Preston George or any of the bosses directly?
A. No.

(Dep. of Mark Adams at 26, 11. 5-14, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013).
Clearly, Adams did not act with reasonable diligence because, according to him, he made
no inquiry of Preston or the principals at Edged as to Webb's authority. Therefore,
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Adams is chargeable with knowing what kind of authority Webb actually had, and the
fault cannot be thrown on Edged, who never authorized the alleged contract.
However, in its Memorandum Decision and Order the District Court concludes
that "Chamberlain [v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 42 Idaho 604 (1926)] has been implicitly
overruled by subsequent pronouncements of the Idaho Supreme Court on apparent
authority," declaring that it will adhere to Bailey and its progeny, as opposed to
Chamberlain and the Idaho Court of Appeals cases cited immediately above. (R at 595).
This the District Court stated as its legal basis for granting Northwest's motion for
summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim. However, Bailey and its progeny
still hold that "[a]pparent authority cannot be created by the acts and statements of the
agent alone" and that "whether or not there is apparent authority on the agent's part to act
as he acted-it is a question for the trier of fact to resolve from the evidence." Bailey v.
Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497-98 (1985).
Even accepting the District Court's reasoning and conclusion in this respect as
entirely valid and that the law encapsulated in Chamberlain, Hilt, Hausam, and Podolan
is not an accurate reflection of Idaho law, the creation of apparent authority still requires
that a "principal voluntarily places an agent in such as position that a person of ordinary
prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is
justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Id. at 497.
Whether Northwest is justified in believing Webb was acting pursuant to existing
authority is, at the very least, subject to conflicting reasonable inferences that should have
precluded summary judgment.
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First, the record contains conflicting inferences as to whether Edged entered into a
contract with Northwest for the non-warranty replacement of the engine. Adams claims
to have gotten permission from Webb to replace the engine. (Dep. of Mark Adams at 25,
11. 2-5, taken 5/2312012, augmented 3/1512013). Meanwhile, Preston states very bluntly
that Webb's authority extended only to his bringing the Skid to Northwest for diagnosis
and that he had no authority to authorize repairs. (R at 152, 153, pp. 115, 116, 11. 17-25,

1-7).
As for Webb, his statements that he had authority from Preston or Edged all come
packaged with speculation and equivocation. First of all, Webb has a potentially large
pecuniary interest at stake in his deposition testimony. Had he approved transactions that
he was not authorized to approve, while admitting he never received such authorization,
he would be open to a potential lawsuit from Edged. His testimony reflects this interest,
which must be brought before a trier of fact to determine Webb's credibility. (R at 106,
pp. 18, 19, 11. 11-25, 1-6). In his deposition it sounds as if Webb is attempting to
convince everyone that he did no wrong, instead of merely testifying that Preston did or
did not give him authority:
Q: When you talked with Mr. Adams, you understood that
the Boxer skid steer was going to be fixed, and there was
going to be a charge associated with it?
A: ... I never blind-sided Preston. I was very honest. And I
took several notes. And I wish I could find my notebooks
as to our conversations, be it with Mark . . . I never ever
blind-sided him. Every conversation I had on the telephone
with anything that had anything to do with that business, I
either took notes or spoke to him while he was in the room
while I was on the phone. Never once did I ever try to just
surprise him with a bill.
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ld. Webb claims to have made notes of all his dealings, yet these notes have gone

mlssmg.
In addition, when asked whether Preston authorized him to approve the skid
engine replacement, Webb states "I can safely say yes because I know that - I mean, it's
not my decision.... Knowing how I am personally, I wouldn't have made that decision
on my own." (R at 106, p. 19, 11. 13-18). Webb acknowledges that his "knowledge" of
Preston's approval rests on pure speculation, based on the fact it would not have been his
decision and "how [he is] personally." ld.
Further, when asked whether Adams, prior to the replacement work, informed
Webb that Edged would have to pay for the replacement, Webb states:
And then I think I presented Preston with that. He doesn't
think he can fix it underneath any kind of umbrella
warranty, you know. And then I was asked, you know, by
Mark, do you want me to replace the engine. This is
speculation. Again, I don't - there was conversations that
were held that ended up - the final determination was to
have them replace the engine while it was there.
And I know he had either faxed or e-emailed me a
bid that I presented to Preston. And at that point the engine
was fixed, and we got a call to come get it. And it's a little
cloudy. I just-the progression of having something fixed
is what I'm basing my memory off of.
(R at 107, pp. 22, 23, 11. 25, 1-13) (emphasis added). Webb makes it abundantly

clear that, not only is most of his recollection "speculation," but also it is entirely based
off of "having something fixed." ld. It appears that Webb, starting with the knowledge
that the engine was replaced, worked backwards and filled in his "cloudy" memory with
what must have occurred to get the engine replaced. Thus his testimony when asked if
Preston authorized him to approve the replacement: "I safely say yes because I know that
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I mean, it's not my decision .... Knowing how I am personally, I wouldn't have made
that decision on my own." (R at 106, p. 19,11. 13-18).
The combined statements of Adams and Preston alone create a genuine issue of
material fact in terms of credibility and raise conflicting inferences regarding the facts of
the case. Webb's statements further muddy the water in that he seems to testify, on one
hand, that Preston gave him authority while, on the other hand, stating that his testimony
is "speculation" and based on the process and "progression of having something fixed."
His testimony is suspect and itself creates a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
bring this issue before a trier of fact.
Second, even had Webb authorized the replacement of the engine in the Skid, the
record contains conflicting inferences as to whether he had apparent authority to approve
anything as to Northwest. As mentioned above, apparent authority exists "when a
principal voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary
prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is
justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Clark v.
Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12 (1972). The evidence presented offers conflicting inferences as
to, for example, whether Edged voluntarily placed Webb in a position to be mistaken as
someone who was authorized

to

approve of a non-warranty engine replacement. The

evidence further presents conflicting inferences as to whether Northwest and Adams were
justified in believing that Webb was acting pursuant to existing authority.
This Court has held that a third party has "the duty of using reasonable diligence
to ascertain if [a principle] and its employee [have] authority .... " Idaho Title Co. v.
American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 468 (1975). Webb was a low-level, temporary
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worker, calling himself "just a body." (R at 103, pp. 6, 7,11. 25, 1-23). Adams had a duty,
at the very least, to use reasonable diligence to ascertain if Webb had any authority
beyond delivering the Skid. However, he claims he never spoke with Edged's principle,
Preston, and that he simply "thought he was dealing with a standup company," which was
his justification for exercising absolutely no diligence to ascertain Webb's authority.
(Dep. of Mark Adams at 25, 11. 17-24, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013).

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER EDGED'S STATUTE

OF FRAUDS ARGUMENT
The District Court seems to have failed to consider Edged's argument that the
Statute of Frauds prevents Northwest from presenting its evidence of the alleged contract
between Edged and Northwest for the replacement of the engine in the Skid, as such was
not addressed in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order. The Statute of
Frauds, as applied in Idaho, provides the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale
has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker.
IDAHO CODE § 28-2-201(1) (emphasis added).
Northwest utilizes as a defense to Edged's breach of contract claim that Edged,
through its agent, Webb, made a contract with Northwest for the replacement of the
engine in the Skid. The engine was a good for which Northwest attempted to bill Edged
at $3,000, clearly exceeding the threshold for a "sale of goods for the price of $500 or
more." (R at 193). Given the sale price for the engine of more than $500, Northwest is not
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entitled to present the contract by way of defense unless there is "some writing to indicate
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker." IDAHO CODE § 28-2201(1) (emphasis added).

As Adams, owner of Northwest, admits, Northwest received nothing in writing
granting it authorization to replace the engine. (Dep. of Mark Adams at 25, 11. 6-9, taken
5/2312012, augmented 3/1512013). In addition, Northwest has not produced any writing

purporting to fulfill the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. As such, Northwest simply
cannot be allowed to present this purported contract as a defense to Edged's breach of
contract claims. An exception may apply, under Idaho case law, if Edged had paid for or
accepted the replacement engine. However, this is not the case, but rather Edged, through
Preston, rejected the engine and asked that it be taken out. (R at 174, p. 202, 11. 10, 11).
Northwest could conceivably argue a further statutory exception to the Statute of
Frauds by claiming that it sent a confirmatory writing of the alleged contract within a
reasonable time, in accordance with Idaho Code § 28-2-201(2), which provides the
following:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the
sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to
know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of
objection to its contents is given within ten (10) days after
it is received.
IDAHO CODE §

28-2-201(2) (emphasis added).

Northwest has presented a document dated May 28, 2009, purporting to be an
invoice and which it may claim was sent to Edged as a "confirmatory writing." (R at
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300). However, this exception fails for Northwest for at least two reasons: (1) Preston,
owner of Edged, testified that he never received an invoice. (R at 172, p. 194, 11. 21-23);
and (2) the purported invoice was not sent or received, if at all, within a reasonable time
as required in the statute. The purported invoice appears not to have been generated, let
alone sent or received, until May 28, 2009, which eight days after Adams and Northwest
report having done the engine replacement. (R at 297; Dep. of Mark Adams at 21, 11. 8-

11, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013).
Idaho Code § 28-1-205 defines "reasonable time," stating that "[ w]hether a time
for taking an action required by the uniform commercial code is reasonable depends on
the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action." IDAHO CODE § 28-1-205(a).
Further, the official comment to the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by Idaho,
states that "[s]ubsection (a) makes it clear that requirements that actions be taken within a
'reasonable' time are to be applied in the transactional context of the particular action."

Id., at cmt. 1. In Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., the
Supreme Court stated that, in determining the issue of reasonability, "courts have
considered such factors as the nature of the goods to be delivered, the extent of the
seller's knowledge of the buyer's intention, transportation conditions, and the nature of
the market." 98 Idaho 495,504 (1977).
Given the circumstances of this alleged commercial transaction for replacement of
the engine, mailing or receipt of an invoice for such replacement cannot be considered
received "within a reasonable time" when before the receipt of the "confirmatory
writing" the work is already complete and the good has been made a part of Edged's Skid
to Edged's significant detriment. To hold otherwise would be to encourage shops, such as
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Northwest, to green-light its own work and hold customers ransom for services they did
not approve. Not only did the nature of the good (the engine specially ordered from
Perkins) make this alleged transaction one that would require a confirmatory writing
before incurring such expense and firmly installing it into Edged's Skid, but also
Northwest should have been keenly aware of Edged's intention to have the engine
repaired under warranty and its further intention to use the repaired Skid for substantial
income-producing activities.
Certainly, if Northwest had desired to protect itself and preserve any such
defenses, it should have been more circumspect in either having a standard work
order/contract signed by customers like Edged or sending a confirmatory fax before the
work was commenced and completed. Although the record contains conflicting
inferences as to whether an invoice was sent to Edged at all, it is clear and undisputed
that an invoice was, at best, sent after the work was completed to Edged's detriment.
For these myriad conflicting inferences, Webb's lack of authority to authorize the
replacement and the Statute of Frauds, Northwest's motion for summary judgment as to
Edged's second breach of contract claim should not have been granted.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the record and pleadings filed in this case, Appellant has met his
minimal burden of producing facts that demonstrate material disputes of fact as to each
challenged element of his claims. As such, the District Court's decision is in error, and
must be reversed so that the issue of apparent authority make be determined by the trier
of fact-the jury Edged has demanded.
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